

file

25X1

Internal Distribution

1 - DCI (7E47)
2 - DDCI (7E47)
3 - SA/DCI (7E47)
4 - ED/DCI (7E47)
5 - Executive Registry (7E47)
6 - DDI (7E47)
7 - Senior Review Panel (7B42)
8-12 - OCPAS/IMD/CB (7G15)
13 - NIO/USSR-EE (7E47)
14 - NIO/SP (2E49)
15 - C/DDO/SE [] (7E22)
16 - DDO/SE [] (7E22)
17 - C/DDO/PPS (7E22)
18 - DDO/PPS [] (7E22)
[] (814 Key)
20 - D/SOVA (4E58)
21 - DD/SOVA (4E58)
22 - EXO/SOVA (4E58)
23 - C/SOVA/NIG (4E65)
24 - C/SOVA/NIG/EPD (5E66)
25 - C/SOVA/NIG/DPD (4E65)
26 - C/SOVA/NIG/DPD/LP (4E65)
27 - C/SOVA/NIG/DPD/BF (4E65)
28 - C/SOVA/NIG/DPD/SI (5E66)
29 - C/SOVA/RIG (5E25)
30 - C/SOVA/RIG/EAD (5E25)
31 - C/SOVA/RIG/TWAD (4E12)
32 - C/SOVA/SIG (4E13)
33 - C/SOVA/SIG/SFD (4E13)
34 - C/SOVA/SIG/SPD (4E13)
35 - C/SOVA/DEIG (5E46)
36 - C/SOVA/DEIG/DEA (5E68)
37 - C/SOVA/DEIG/DID (4E31)
39 - PDB Staff (7F30)
40 - DD/NIC/AG (7E47)
41 - C/ES/CIB (4E66)
42 - C/FBIS/AG (1016 KEY)
43 - [] FBIS/USSR Division
44 - C/ACIS (7D35)
45 - C/CRES (3E63)
46 - C/IPC (2F21)
47 - D/ALA (3F45)
48 - D/NESA (6G42)
49 - D/EURA (5G44)
50 - C/PES/MPS (6F44)
51 - D/OCPAS (7F17)
52 - D/OCR (2E60)
53 - D/OEA (4F18)
54 - D/OGI (3G00)
55 - D/OIA (BLDG. 213)
56 - D/OSWR (5F46)

DATE 2/24/86DOC NO SOVA M 86-20017OCR 3P&PD 1

1- file

Sourced

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

[redacted]
Central Intelligence Agency

25X1



Washington, D.C. 20505

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

21 February 1986

Recent Speeches of Republic Party Chiefs: A Preview of the 27th CPSU Congress

Summary

To judge from the recent speeches of republic first secretaries, next week's 27th CPSU Congress will witness a well-orchestrated assault on Mikhail Gorbachev's opponents. Speaking to their regional party congresses, several first secretaries delivered sharp attacks on Brezhnev-era officials and charged that their discredited leadership style continues to be widespread. Some first secretaries even blamed themselves for the persistence of such problems, and one--Kazakhstan's Dinmukhamed Kunayev, a Politburo member--was subjected to withering criticism by lower-level officials. [redacted]

25X1

Such criticism was almost certainly intended to place opponents of Gorbachev's policies on the defensive and to increase the pressure on party and government officials to implement these policies strictly. Developments at the regional congresses indicate that the desired results were generally achieved. On the 1986-90 Five-Year Plan, for example, officials who earlier had complained about planned resource allocations to their republics reversed

This paper was prepared by [redacted]

25X1

[redacted] the Office of Soviet Analysis and [redacted]
[redacted] the Office of Central Reference. Comments and questions can be addressed
[redacted] to the Chief, Domestic Policy Division, SOVA on [redacted]

25X1

25X1

SOVA M-86-20017

25X1

25X1

25X1

themselves at the congresses and argued that greater discipline and better management--not additional resources--were what was needed to assure plan fulfillment. [redacted]

25X1

The regional leaders also were in tune with Gorbachev's pronouncements on social issues and international relations. In contrast to the Brezhnev years, when optimism about the future of Soviet society reigned supreme, the first secretaries painted pictures of a society plagued by corruption and crime and also stressed the urgency of Gorbachev's campaigns against corruption and alcohol abuse. Although having little to say on foreign policy, they generally lined up behind his recent arms control proposals and applauded his summit diplomacy. [redacted]

25X1

The speeches of the republic party leaders provide a number of clues about themes that will be developed at next week's CPSU Congress:

- Criticism of the Brezhnev regime, and especially its management of the economy, is likely to be a key issue.
- Assaults on current party and government leaders who have failed to adopt the new regime's management style also appear to be in the offing. Offenders will be clearly identified, and even Politburo members may not be exempt.
- The republic leaders' comments suggest that the policy documents scheduled for approval at the Congress--the guidelines for the 12th Five-Year Plan, the new edition of the party program, and the revised party rules--will strongly reflect Gorbachev's views.
- The high turnover in the republic Central Committees also indicates that the Congress could replace nearly half of the members of the Central Committee and significantly strengthen Gorbachev's base of support. [redacted]

25X1

Still, the reelections of Kunayev and Ukrainian First Secretary Vladimir Shcherbitskiy--both [redacted] targets of the attack on Brezhnev-era leaders--suggest that Gorbachev has not completely overcome his opponents. The first secretaries' generally scant discussion of economic reform may also indicate a lack of enthusiasm for this key element of Gorbachev's economic agenda. [redacted]

25X1
25X1

25X1

25X1

Recent Speeches of Republic Party Chiefs:
A Preview of the 27th Party Congress

Congresses of the Communist Parties of the Soviet republics are the final events in a hierarchical series of meetings, beginning with the primary party organizations at the workplace, that lead to the national (CPSU) Congress--a meeting held about every five years to establish policy guidelines and elect the party's "leading organs," the Central Committee and Central Auditing Commission.* Although carefully orchestrated by the party leadership, these congresses are important occasions for party officials to air their views on problems of local and nationwide concern. Issues that emerge at the republic meetings, therefore, often provide hints of themes that will be more fully developed at the CPSU Congress. [redacted]

25X1

The Focus on Cadre Renewal

Predictably, with Gorbachev still new in office, cadre renewal--a key means of consolidating the General Secretary's power--was a principal theme at all the regional congresses. In the months leading up to these party meetings Gorbachev had scored remarkable successes in replacing members of the regional party buros and secretariats and other officials holding positions that historically have warranted election to the republics' Central Committees. These successes were underscored at the republic congresses, where the turnover rate in the Central Committees ranged from 41 to almost 80 percent. (See Table 2) [redacted]

25X1

Criticism of the Brezhnev Era

In keeping with the focus on cadre renewal, the need for a decisive break with the Brezhnev-era leadership style was a dominant theme at the regional congresses. In contrast to the obsequious pattern of the Brezhnev years, for example, there were few flattering references to the General Secretary in the regional leaders' speeches. Several Brezhnev-era leaders, moreover, were criticized by name, lending credence to reports

*Congresses are held in all of the Soviet republics except the RSFSR, which has no separate party organization of its own. This paper covers the speeches delivered by the 14 republic first secretaries and the leaders of the two most politically important party organizations in the RSFSR--the capital city, Moscow, and Leningrad Oblast. [redacted]

25X1

The Agendas of Republic Party Congresses

The agendas of the republic party congresses replicate that of the CPSU Congress. The first secretary presents an account of the Central Committee's stewardship since the previous congress; the chairman of the Council of Ministers delivers a report on the guidelines of the new five-year plan to be adopted at the CPSU Congress; and any special business on the agenda--this year, a revision of the party's program and rules--is discussed. The congress then elects its delegates to the CPSU Congress and a new Central Committee, which later meets in plenary session to decide on the composition of its Buro (or Politburo) and Secretariat.

[redacted] that criticism of Brezhnev's leadership and the policy drift that prevailed during his regime will be a major theme of Gorbachev's keynote address at the CPSU Congress. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

Criticism of Brezhnev-era leaders was especially sharp in the Central Asian republics, which until recently were strongholds of the late General Secretary's proteges. At the Turkmen Party Congress, for example, newly named First Secretary Saparmurad Niyazov delivered a broadside against his predecessor, Mukhamednazar Gapurov, for promoting cadres on the basis of personal loyalty or family ties, establishing a breeding ground for nepotism, flattery, and careerism and creating an atmosphere of servility and irresponsibility. Another speaker--Vadim Zagladin, first deputy chief of the Central Committee's International Department--linked stagnation, mismanagement, and corruption in Turkmenistan to similar problems at the national level, inviting identification of Gapurov's leadership with Brezhnev's. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

In Kirgiziya, First Secretary Absamat Masaliyev castigated his predecessor for creating an atmosphere of "toadying and flattery." Tadzhik First Secretary Kakhar Makhkamov criticized his republic's former party chief in similar terms, endorsed Gorbachev's strategy of breaking up the local party fiefdoms that had flourished under Brezhnev, and advocated transferring officials from one regional party organization to another and moving them back and forth between central and local organizations to "introduce a breath of fresh air." Uzbek party chief Inamdzhon Usmanhodzhayev accused former First Secretary Sharaf Rashidov of patronizing corrupt party and state officials. [redacted]

25X1

In Central Asia and other republics as well, party leaders did not exempt themselves from responsibility for allowing Brezhnev-era problems to persist. Uzbekistan's Usmanhodzhayev

Table 1

Regional Party Chiefs

<u>Party Organization</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Date Elected</u>
Armenia	Karen Demirchyan	24 Nov 74
Azerbaijdzhan	Kyamran Bagirov	3 Dec 82
Belorussia	Nikolay Slyun'kov	13 Jan 83
Estonia	Karl Vayno	26 Jul 78
Georgia	Dzhumbar Patiashvili	6 Jul 85
Kazakhstan	Dinmukhamed Kunayev	7 Dec 64
Kirgiziya	Absamat Masaliyev	24 Oct 85
Latvia	Boris Pugo	14 Apr 84
Leningrad Oblast	Yuriy Solov'yev	9 Jul 85
Lithuania	Pyatras Grishkyavichus	18 Feb 74
Moldavia	Semen Grossu	22 Dec 80
Moscow City	Boris Yel'tsin	24 Dec 85
Tadzhikistan	Kakhar Makhkamov	14 Dec 85
Turkmenistan	Saparmurad Niyazov	21 Dec 85
Ukraine	Vladimir Shcherbitskiy	27 May 72
Uzbekistan	Inamdzhon Usmankhodzhayev	3 Nov 83

Table 2
REGIONAL PARTY OFFICIALS REPLACED SINCE GORBACHEV BECAME GENERAL SECRETARY

	Buro or Politburo*	Secretariat			Full Mbrs	Central Committee		% Replaced
		1st Sec	2nd Sec	Other Secs		Cand Mbrs	Total	
Armenia	4 (of 18)	no	yes	4 (of 4)	52 (of 121)	29 (of 61)	81 (of 182)	44%
Azerbaijdzhan	6 (of 18)	no	no	0 (of 4)	53 (of 128)	29 (of 72)	82 (of 200)	41%
Belorussia	8 (of 19)	no	no	0 (of 4)	92 (of 151)	44 (of 68)	136 (of 219)	62%
Estonia	7 (of 17)	no	yes	0 (of 3)	48 (of 131)	43 (of 68)	91 (of 199)	46%
Georgia	5 (of 19)	yes**	no	2 (of 4)	73 (of 148)	38 (of 63)	111 (of 211)	53%
Kazakhstan	4 (of 11)	no	no	2 (of 4)	122 (of 175)	39 (of 67)	161 (of 242)	67%
Kirgiziya	8 (of 14)	yes	yes	3 (of 3)	89 (of 142)	35 (of 58)	124 (of 200)	62%
Latvia	6 (of 14)	no	no	2 (of 3)	63 (of 141)	35 (of 65)	98 (of 206)	48%
Lithuania	0 (of 14)	no	no	0 (of 3)	61 (of 146)	29 (of 73)	90 (of 219)	41%
Moldavia	6 (of 15)	no	no	0 (of 3)	54 (of 125)	35 (of 55)	89 (of 180)	49%
Tadzhikistan	7 (of 12)	yes	yes	0 (of 3)	76 (of 132)	42 (of 56)	118 (of 188)	63%
Turkmenistan	5 (of 14)	yes	no	1 (of 3)	86 (of 154)	27 (of 44)	113 (of 198)	57%
Ukraine	1 (of 16)	no	no	1 (of 5)	74 (of 197)	56 (of 92)	130 (of 289)	44%
Uzbekistan	10 (of 17)	no	yes	2 (of 3)	123 (of 167)	65 (of 75)	188 (of 242)	78%
Moscow Gorkom	13 (of 17)	yes	yes	1 (of 4)	125 (of 175)	35 (of 57)	160 (of 232)	69%
Leningrad Obkom***	9 (of 19)	yes**	no	2 (of 4)				

*The Buros in Armenia, Latvia, Lithuania, and the Ukraine were increased in size, while those in Georgia, Kirgiziya, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan were reduced.

**The Georgian and Leningrad Oblast first secretaries were promoted; others appear to have been removed for shortcomings.

***Comparative figures are not available for Leningrad Oblast.

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

was especially self-critical. After expounding on the abuses that had occurred under First Secretary Rashidov, he confessed to having been "hypnotized" by his onetime party chief and to having lacked the "civic courage" to oppose him. [REDACTED]

25X1

Even members of the Politburo were not immune from criticism at the congresses. In Moscow, for example, the published version of party chief Boris Yel'tsin's speech did not mention his predecessor Viktor Grishin by name, but the criticism of Grishin, until last Tuesday a member of the party's ruling body, was thinly veiled. The city party committee, which Grishin had headed, was faulted for ostentation, hushing up shortcomings, complacency, and inertia. [REDACTED]

25X1

In Kazakhstan, the criticism of First Secretary Kunayev--once an especially close Brezhnev crony--was sharper and more explicit than that directed at Moscow's Grishin and was probably all the more galling because it came at the hands of lower-level party officials. Pravda's account of the Kazakh Congress, moreover, marked the first time in decades that a sitting member of the Politburo was criticized by name in the central press. The newspaper quoted an oblast first secretary who complained about his predecessor's nepotism and hushed-up economic failures and then asked: "Did the Central Committee Buro and First Secretary D. Kunayev know about this? They could not fail to know." Although Kunayev was reelected as Kazakh party chief and may keep his Politburo seat at the CPSU Congress, his harsh treatment in the national press suggests that his days in office are numbered. [REDACTED]

25X1

In contrast to Kunayev, Ukrainian party boss Shcherbitskiy, another reported target of the campaign against Brezhnev-era leaders, apparently emerged unscathed from his republic's congress. Pravda's account of the Ukrainian conclave gave no indication that Shcherbitskiy's political fortunes are in decline. To judge from the published version of this speech, moreover, Shcherbitskiy exuded self-confidence. Unlike other republic leaders, he did not claim to be guided in personnel matters by the decisions taken at plenums convened since Gorbachev took power and found only little fault with his own subordinates, claiming that most party leaders have "justified the confidence in them and enjoy well deserved prestige and respect." [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

Economic Issues

The theme of self-criticism also pervaded the discussion of economic issues. Regional officials who had openly complained in November about the proposed allocation of resources to their areas in the 1986-90 Five-Year Plan focused almost solely on self-criticism at the republic congresses, suggesting that debate on this issue was quickly brought to an end. Speakers devoted particular attention to their republics' shortcomings in assimilating equipment, their failure to complete planned construction projects, and their initiation of new, unplanned construction. [REDACTED]

25X1

Most first secretaries claimed that increased discipline and oversight--rather than more resources from Moscow--would be sufficient to improve their republics' economic performance. There was also the hint of a possible crackdown--which past experience suggests will not be successful--on attempts by Soviet enterprises to evade demanding plan targets. Latvian First Secretary Boris Pugo noted that 76 enterprises had tried last year to have their plan targets lowered but warned that this would no longer be tolerated. [REDACTED]

25X1

Most speakers said little about Gorbachev's recent planning and management changes and offered few reform proposals of their own, focusing instead on the need to strengthen party and state leadership of the economy. While Gorbachev too has stressed the need to improve the quality of economic management and oversight, the emphasis these speakers placed on party and state control seemed somewhat at odds with his endorsement of economic, as opposed to administrative, levers of management and steps to increase the autonomy of enterprise managers. [REDACTED]

25X1

The emphasis on the need for improved leadership rather than reform was most apparent in the speech of Moscow party chief Yel'tsin. He blamed Moscow's economic failures almost entirely on the city's party committee which, he said, had created an atmosphere of complacency by failing to ensure that Moscow's factories established sufficiently ambitious targets. Yel'tsin emphasized that increased order and discipline would play the decisive role in revitalizing the economy and seemed to be taking a swipe at reformers with his assertion that "narrow pragmatism" and "mercenary views" of the economy were "alien to Communists." [REDACTED]

25X1

The few party leaders who did speak out on the issue of management reform focused on changes that would give regional authorities (i.e., themselves) more control over plans affecting their areas. Georgian First Secretary Dzhumbar Patiashvili called such changes important for the acceleration of economic development and praised experiments in territorial planning that are being conducted in the Georgian cities of Poti and Tbilisi. In Latvia, Pugo called for amending the draft Party Program to

endorse the wider use of territorial planning and said it should become a part of national long-term plans. [REDACTED]

25X1

The Ukraine's Shcherbitskiy, Belorussia's Slyun'kov, and Georgia's Patiashvili were the only leaders to focus on the need to reorganize and reduce the economic bureaucracy. Shcherbitskiy touted his republic's success in reducing the size and cost of the administrative apparatus. Slyun'kov noted that the size of the bureaucracy and the paper work it generates have become obstacles to the solution of urgent economic problems, and Patiashvili seemed impatient with the pace of reorganization efforts. While most speakers made only brief mention of the recent reorganization of the agro-industrial sector, Patiashvili called upon the chairman of the republic's new State Agro-Industrial Committee to move speedily to put the new organization in order and make it a model for reorganizing other sectors in the republic. [REDACTED]

25X1

Only a few measures that have been endorsed by reformist economists received some qualified support. For example, the Kirgiz, Lithuanian and Moldavian first secretaries all supported an expansion of the private sector's role in agriculture. (Patiashvili, however, cautioned that tighter control of the private sector was needed, noting that in some Georgian districts the use of private labor had been "perverted" and large sums of cash paid out without the necessary supervision.) Most party leaders also endorsed measures to make enterprises and worker brigades financially self-supporting, but made it clear that key decisions would have to remain outside those organizations' control, undercutting the advantages some Soviet economists have seen in the move towards greater financial autonomy. [REDACTED]

25X1

Social Issues

The self-critical style of the regional congresses was also reflected in unusually frank discussions of Soviet social problems. In contrast to the practice of the Brezhnev years, when optimism about the future of Soviet society reigned supreme at the regional congresses, the republic first secretaries painted pictures of a society plagued by corruption and crime. They also acknowledged the persistence of religious beliefs and, while praising Gorbachev's anti-alcohol campaign, generally maintained that much more remained to be accomplished on this front. Their discussion of nationality relations suggested a greater sense of vulnerability to foreign influences than Soviet leaders have traditionally expressed. [REDACTED]

25X1

Criticism of corruption was most intense in the Central Asian republics--where Brezhnev-era leaders often were held responsible--but every first secretary had a great deal to say on the corruption problem. All of them cited the names and positions of senior officials who had been removed for

"degeneracy." This list included secretaries of the Georgian, Turkmen and Tadzhik parties, a Deputy Premier of Moldavia, the Azerbaydzhani Minister of Cotton Production, the first secretaries of four Belorussian rayon (district) party committees, and the Latvian Minister of Procurement.

- In Kirgiziya, party chief Masaliyev described corruption as an organized force, stating that party leaders had created virtual "mafias."
- In Kazakhstan, it was reported that 500 "leading personnel" had been fired for moral turpitude, including 78 staff members at institutions of higher learning where, according to Pravda, admission, passing grades, and graduation were all for sale.
- In Georgia, where a member of the Secretariat had been removed from his post and arrested for "flagrant violations of the norms of party and professional ethics," First Secretary Patiashvili quoted Lenin's remark that "where there is bribery, there is no question of policy" and grimly noted that "the process of revolutionary purification is continuing even now."

25X1
25X1

These charges were made against the backdrop of a series of personnel changes in the regional Ministries of Internal Affairs (MVDs), Committees for State Security (KGBs) and Party Control Commissions that had signaled a toughening of Moscow's attack on corruption. The casualties included the MVD chiefs in Uzbekistan, Tadzhikistan and Georgia, the KGB chairman in Kazakhstan, and the chiefs of the Administrative Organs Departments of the Central Committees in Latvia, Tadzhikistan and Uzbekistan.

25X1

While there was no admission that criminal activity was on the increase, comments by republic party leaders expressed dissatisfaction with the progress of efforts to curtail it. Moldavia's Grossu noted that crime was "not decreasing" in many urban areas, and that over 20 percent of criminal acts were committed by the unemployed--a remarkable admission for a system that prides itself on full employment. Lithuanian party leader Pyatras Grishkyavichus censured the republic's organs of control and noted that the number of violations of economic laws "had not been reduced" and that crime remained a serious problem, especially in urban areas.

25X1

In the Caucasus, party leaders tied the rise of crime directly to police corruption. Georgian First Secretary Patiashvili described problems in the republic MVD as "extremely serious" and urged the new police chief to undertake "the most resolute measures" to "purify" the internal affairs organs and

25X1

strengthen discipline. In mid-January, Patiashvili had complained in an interview in the Georgian press that the police were unable to maintain "basic order" in the streets of the capital. [REDACTED]

25X1

The remarks by republic leaders also suggest that the party is marking time, at best, in its effort to suppress expressions of religious faith. While all stressed the need for more effective atheistic propaganda, Lithuanian party chief Grishkyavichus seemed especially agitated, calling for a stepped-up attack on "clerical extremism" and "ideological sabotage under the guise of religion"--remarks that suggest the Catholic Church in Lithuania is gaining ground or at least is continuing to hold its own. In a similar vein, Tadzhikistan's Makhkamov complained that in his republic Islam had "captivated many people" and noted cases of communists and leading personalities taking part in religious celebrations. Comments from other Central Asian republics and Azerbaydzhani also indicated concern about the "survival" of ancient Moslem festivals. In Kazakhstan, one speaker noted that in some regions of the republic it was difficult to tell whether party officials or "self-styled mullahs" were in control. [REDACTED]

25X1

While every republic leader stressed the importance of Gorbachev's campaign against alcoholism and drunkenness, few offered assessments of its effectiveness. Latvia's Pugo was the most forceful in claiming that the campaign had been a success, noting that the number of enterprises serving alcohol had declined by two-thirds, the overall sales of liquor had dropped 21 percent, and the republic party organization had developed "new alcohol-free rituals." Moldavia's Semen Grossu, however, admitted that the campaign had not yet been successful in his republic and that a comprehensive program had not yet been put into effect--a failing he blamed on the laxness of the republic's Ministry of Health, the Komsomol, and the trade unions. [REDACTED]

25X1

Two constants in all the first secretaries' reports were attacks on "bourgeois nationalism" and praise for the "great Russian people" or the "great Russian language." While the Moldavian and Armenian party leaders noted the danger of "national bourgeois" propaganda, Latvia's Pugo and Lithuania's Grishkyavichus struck particularly hard at "centers of bourgeois nationalism" that enflame nationalist tendencies in their republics. Moldavian party chief Grossu drew special attention to his republic's "frontier" location (it borders Romania), which he said made it a target for "ideological sabotage." [REDACTED]

25X1

Comments on the issue of housing and public services were standard fare except for a few statements that were particularly revealing about the regime's failure to respond to the populace's needs. Kirgiz First Secretary Masaliyev noted that in Frunze, the republic's capital, 200,000 people (30-40 percent of the

25X1

25X1

population) lacked indoor toilets and running water and that "tens of thousands" of people lacked housing. Pravda's commentary on the Kazakh Congress also revealed that new housing in that republic's capital, Alma Ata, was distributed out of turn to the friends and relatives of party officials, while invalids and war veterans lacked well-appointed housing and have been waiting "many years" to obtain it. [REDACTED]

25X1

Foreign Policy

As is customary at these events, the republic party leaders focused their attention almost solely on domestic issues. Virtually all of them, however, gave their endorsement to Gorbachev's 15 January arms control proposal, which they usually followed with pledges to continue their efforts to strengthen the country's defense. Most also made some favorable comment on Gorbachev's meeting with President Reagan. One of the few exceptions was Ukrainian party chief Shcherbitskiy, a Politburo member, whose assessment of the results of that meeting had earlier appeared to be less positive than Gorbachev's. [REDACTED]

25X1

Kirgiziya's Masaliyev may share Shcherbitskiy's reservations about the benefits of recent summit diplomacy. Masaliyev failed to mention the Reagan-Gorbachev talks but instead called upon the US to take some "practical actions" if it "really seeks peace." [REDACTED]

25X1

The most extensive remarks on foreign policy were made by Vadim Zagladin--first deputy chief of the Central Committee's International Department--who addressed the Turkmen Party Congress. Carrying the anti-Brezhnev theme to an extreme, Zagladin, who often emphasizes the connection between economic strength and international influence, placed part of the blame for the failure of detente on the mismanagement of the economy "in the early 1970s." He also said that the USSR believes firmly in settling armed conflicts through negotiations, including in "neighboring Afghanistan" and in the Iran-Iraq war, and noted that more would be done in this direction "in the immediate future." [REDACTED]

25X1

The only other significant comments on foreign relations came from the leaders of two republics that border on Afghanistan. Tadzhikistan's Makhkamov noted that since the last republic party congress in 1981, Tadzhikistan's scientific-technical cooperation and trade with socialist countries, "particularly the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan," had "developed and deepened." Turkmenistan's Niyazov, in a possible allusion to the consequences of the war across the border, said it was necessary to strengthen relations between the Turkmen people and the military units that "protect our motherland's southern frontiers" and to display constant concern for "the families of dead servicemen and those now in military service." [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

Implications

The speeches of the republic party leaders provide a number of clues about themes that will be developed at next week's CPSU Congress:

- Criticism of the Brezhnev regime, and especially its management of the economy, seems likely to be a key issue.
- Assaults on current party and government leaders who have failed to adopt the new regime's management style also appear to be in the offing. Offenders will be clearly identified, and, to judge from the open criticism of Kunayev, even Politburo members may not be exempt.
- The republic leaders' comments suggest that the policy documents scheduled for approval at the Congress--the guidelines for the 12th Five-Year Plan, the new edition of the party program, and the revised party rules--will strongly reflect Gorbachev's views.
- The high turnover in the republic Central Committees also indicates that the Congress could replace nearly half of the members of the Central Committee and significantly strengthen Gorbachev's base of support. [redacted]

25X1

The republic meetings also provided indications of continued resistance to Gorbachev on some issues. Gorbachev's failure to remove Kunayev, despite [redacted] that he would be ousted, was the strongest indication of opposition. In addition, the scant attention paid to Gorbachev's management reform efforts--while probably partly reflective of regional party leaders' preoccupation with increasing discipline--also suggests that he faces an uphill battle on issues vital to his economic strategy. Some members of the national leadership also have been reticent on this issue--especially senior secretary Yegor Ligachev, whose growing influence is suggested by the fact that he was the only national leader, other than Gorbachev, whose views were cited by a republic party chief. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

Nonetheless, the results of this week's Central Committee plenum, which removed old guard leaders Grishin and Konstantin Rusakov, suggest that Gorbachev is still on the move. Next week's CPSU Congress will give him an important opportunity to further advance his policy agenda, strengthen his base of support in the Central Committee and make additional leadership changes. The outcome should provide a better gauge of his political progress. [redacted]

25X1

External Distribution

BYRON L. JACKSON
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE LIAISON
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
ROOM 6854
MAIN COMMERCE

[REDACTED]
VICE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, INTELLIGENCE AND
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
ROOM 3E286
THE PENTAGON

25X1

DARNELL WHITT
INTELLIGENCE ADVISOR TO THE UNDERSECRETARY FOR POLICY
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
ROOM 4D840
THE PENTAGON

[REDACTED]
DIA/VP-I
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
RM. 1C760
THE PENTAGON

25X1

DR. WYNFRED JOSHUA
DIO FOR EUROPEAN AND SOVIET POLITICAL/
MILITARY AFFAIRS
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
ROOM 2C238
THE PENTAGON

JAMES W. MORRISON
DIRECTOR, OASD/ISP/EUR/REGIONAL POLICY
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
RM. 1D469
THE PENTAGON

[REDACTED]
CIA REP/NMIC
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
RM 2D901A
THE PENTAGON

25X1

AMBASSADOR MORTON I. ABRAMOWITZ
DIRECTOR
BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH
RM. 6531
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AMBASSADOR WILLIAM HARTMAN
U.S. AMBASSADOR
U.S. EMBASSY MOSCOW
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AVIS BOHLEN
POLICY PLANNING STAFF
RM. 7316N
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DON GRAVES
CHIEF, SOVIET INTERNAL AFFAIRS DIVISION
BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH
RM. 4844
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DONALD B. KURSCH
DEPUTY DIRECTOR (ECONOMIC AFFAIRS)
OFFICE OF SOVIET UNION AFFAIRS
BUREAU OF EUROPEAN AND CANADIAN AFFAIRS
ROOM 4223
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

IGOR N. BELOUSOVITCH
SOVIET INTERNAL AFFAIRS DIVISION
BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH
RM. 4844
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

IVAN V. MATUSEK
CHIEF, EASTERN EUROPE DIVISION
OFFICE OF ANALYSIS FOR THE SOV. UNION AND E.E.
BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH
RM. 4750
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

JOHN DANYLYK
CHIEF, COMMUNIST ECON. RELATIONS DIV.
BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH
RM. 8662
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

LOUIS D. SELL
CHIEF, BILATERAL RELATIONS BRANCH
OFFICE OF SOVIET UNION AFFAIRS
BUREAU OF EUROPEAN AND CANADIAN AFFAIRS
RM 4219
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

LYNN PASCOE
DEP.DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF SOVIET UNION AFFAIRS
BUREAU OF EUROPEAN AND CANADIAN AFFAIRS
RM. 4217
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

MARK PALMER
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR
EUROPEAN AND CANADIAN AFFAIRS
RM. 6219
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

MARK R. PARRIS
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF SOVIET UNION AFFAIRS
BUREAU OF EUROPEAN AND CANADIAN AFFAIRS
RM. 4217
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

MARK RAMEE
POLITICAL COUNSELOR
U.S. EMBASSY MOSCOW
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

PAUL GOBLE
OFFICE OF ANALYSIS FOR THE SOVIET UNION
AND EASTERN EUROPE
BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS
RM. 4844
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ROBERT ASHDOWN
A.C.D.A.
RM 5939
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ROBERT H. BARAZ
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF ANALYSIS FOR THE
SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE
BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH
RM. 4758
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ROLAND K. KUCHEL
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF EASTERN EUROPEAN AND
YUGOSLAVIA AFFAIRS
BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH
RM. 5220
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SHAUN BYRNES
POLITICAL SECTION
U.S. EMBASSY, MOSCOW
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WILLIAM H. COURTNEY
SPECIAL ASSISTANT, OFFICE OF THE
UNDER SECRETARY FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS
RM. 7240
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AMBASSADOR HEYWARD ISHAM
CHAIRMAN, HUMINT COMMITTEE
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STAFF
RM. 2509
CHB

AMBASSADOR JACK F. MATLOCK, JR.
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
SR. DIRECTOR, EUROPEAN AND SOVIET AFFAIRS
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
RM. 368
EOB

COL. TYRUS W. COBB
DIRECTOR, EAST-WEST SECTION
EUROPEAN AND SOVIET AFFAIRS
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
ROOM 373
EOB

DONALD GREGG
ASSISTANT TO THE VICE PRESIDENT FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
ROOM 298
THE WHITE HOUSE

DONALD R. FORTIER
DEPUTY ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
WHITE HOUSE

KENNETH DE GRAFFENREID
INTELLIGENCE PROGRAMS
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
ROOM 300
EOB

STEPHEN R. SESTANOVICH
DEPUTY DIRECTOR, POLICY DEVELOPMENT
AND POLITICAL-MILITARY AFFAIRS
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
EOB

[REDACTED]
CHIEF A2
RM. 3N015
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY

25X1

[REDACTED]
CHIEF A213
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY

25X1

LT. GEN. WILLIAM E. ODOM
DIRECTOR
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
T532/CDB
FORT MEADE, MD

[REDACTED]
CHIEF A211
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY

25X1

MANNY RUBIO
DIRECTOR
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
WHITE HOUSE